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Abstract
We analyse the liberal ethics of noninterference in social choice. A
liberal principle, capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired
by John Stuart Mill’s conception of liberty, is examined. The principle
expresses the idea that society should not penalise individuals after
changes in their situation that do not affect others. An impossibility
for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that
satisfies unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be
dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches
in social choice and political philosophy.
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“The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as
are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour
to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket
nor breaks my leg” (Thomas Jefferson. 1785. Notes on the State of
Virginia, ed.1982, New York: Norton, p.159)
1 Introduction
Liberal principles in philosophy and social choice express some notion of
autonomy that individuals in society should enjoy. In this paper we examine a
specific kind of autonomy, couched as a negative freedom. We argue that from
a purely liberal perspective this freedom is justified (likely in conjunction with
many additional freedoms). Our aim is to show that granting individuals this
freedom is highly problematic. The diffi culty takes on the form that is typical
in social choice theory: if the freedom is granted, then either social choices are
not Pareto optimal (social preferences contradict the unanimous agreement
of all individuals), or there must be a dictator in society (social preferences
always conform with those of one individual).
The main liberal principle is presented in section 2. It expresses the
right of the individual to veto society from reversing its stance against her
preferences after a change of circumstances that concerns (for the better or
for the worse) only that individual and nobody else, in the sense that all the
others are indifferent to whether the change takes place or not. We call this
principle Non-Interference.1
The principle is logically weak in that it does not constrain social pref-
erences in a number of situations. Society may or may not compensate an
agent after an adverse change in her circumstances: the principle says noth-
ing about that. The principle is also silent if there exists even one additional
agent who does not remain indifferent to the change. Non-Interference iden-
tifies a set of minimal conditions under which an individual has a right to
make society remain passive after a change in her situation that leaves every-
body else unaffected. Unlike Sen’s famous Minimal Liberty axiom,2 it does
not assign absolute rights over pairs of alternatives: it does not identify a
personal sphere over which individuals have a (positive) right to have their
1In what follows, we use capitals in order to refer to our ‘Principle of Non-Interference’.
When we discuss liberal views in general, we write ‘noninterference’.
2Sen 1970.
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preferences respected, regardless of other agents’preferences.3
While Non-Interference captures a view that can hardly be rejected on
general liberal grounds, we trace back the broad intellectual origin of the
principle more specifically to a classical source, namely John Stuart Mill’s
essay ‘On Liberty’.4 Non-Interference formalises some of the fundamental
insights of his ‘harm principle’, namely the idea that society should not in-
terfere with individual choices whenever the latter have no (harmful) effect
on others. Mill insists that the reasons for the change in circumstances of the
individual (such as neglect, irresponsibility, effort or luck) are not relevant
information for social judgements, provided that nobody else is negatively
affected. In its negative prescription, Mill’s harm principle captures a foun-
dational aspect of liberalism, and one that is often endorsed even by people
who do not subscribe to a liberal philosophy.5
We prove that it is not possible to grant the negative freedom incorpo-
rated in the Principle of Non-Interference without infringing on the basic
democratic principles of unanimity and non-dictatorship. Our analysis here
continues a research programme started in earlier contributions within a wel-
farist framework.6 The arguments of this paper go significantly deeper, as
they dispense altogether with the welfarist assumption: individual utilities
are not postulated to constitute suffi cient information to derive social prefer-
ences.7 Once stripped of its welfare clothes, the nature of the conflict between
principles becomes much starker. The key for this breakthrough is the un-
derstanding that a crucial aspect of a Millian liberal view lies precisely in
forbidding non-welfarist arguments to determine social preferences in certain
circumstances. Hence, the assumption of welfarism turns out to be in fact
redundant.
We analyse the philosophical implications of the clash between Non-
Interference and the democratic principles of unanimity and non-dictatorship.
We argue that the impossibility result highlights important and diffi cult is-
sues for liberal democratic approaches. In particular, we take it as showing
3For a more thorough discussion, see section 6.1 below.
4Mill 1859. References to this work will be given in the text simply as (chap-
ter.paragraph).
5Sen 1976.
6Mariotti and Veneziani 2009; Mariotti and Veneziani 2013.
7Formally, social preferences do not focus on profiles of individual utility levels, as we
do not assume individual preferences to be representable by utility functions and do not
impose any neutrality or independence conditions (see Roemer 1996 for a discussion).
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that democratic social arrangements logically require us to consider some
individual actions as relevant even when they do not affect others. We sug-
gest a way out of the impossibility by a weakening of Non-Interference that
retains some important liberal intuitions, although at the cost of partially
limiting the individual protected sphere.
2 The Principle of Non-Interference
Our analysis is conducted in the standard social choice format of transforming
individual preference orderings into a social preference ordering over social
states. Before we present our main principle, we make two important points
concerning the framework of the analysis.
First, following standard practice in social choice theory, we interpret a
social state x as providing a complete description of the world, which includes
everything that may be relevant for individual and social evaluation. This
assumption rules out any acts or events that are relevant for an individual
but are not known to her, and it is appropriate given that we analyse some
desirable properties of ideal social arrangements. For no ideal moral theory
should be based on the agents’unawareness or ignorance, of key aspects of
social states.8 This indirectly reflects the standard liberal insistence on "free,
voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation" (On Liberty, I.12).9
Second, there are many possible interpretations of the statement "social
state x is (individually or socially) preferred to social state y" and different
concepts of individual and social preferences can be adopted. For example,
one could interpret the statement that x is socially preferred to y in the lan-
guage of choice, as the normative claim that institutions in society should be
so arranged as to guarantee that x is chosen over y, or as the positive claim
that society is indeed organised so that x is chosen over y. Alternatively,
one could interpret the social preference relation as embodying a notion of
moral value, such that x is socially preferred to y means that x is impartially
better than y.10 In this paper we do not opt for a specific interpretation
8See Sen 1983, 19ff.
9In his moral theory, Mill takes what Sugden (1993, 140) defines a synoptic viewpoint
where moral judgements "are made as if from a single, God-like vantage point, from which
every component of the good of the world can be seen in its proper proportion".
10Similar points hold for individual preferences. See, for example, the classic discussion
in Sen 1983; Sen 1992.
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and focus instead on the general formulation using the language of prefer-
ences, as none of our arguments or conclusions depend on a particular view
of the social preference relation. Because we interpret (individual and social)
preference relations in a purely technical fashion - as binary relations over
sets of alternatives - our arguments, and impossibility result, hold both if
one interprets the individual and social orderings in terms of (narrowly con-
ceived) preferences and if one conceives them as embodying choice, consent,
and so on. Alternative approaches lead to different interpretations of the
axioms and of our main result - below we shall provide some illustrations of
alternative interpretations. As Sen has forcefully argued,11 this versatility is
a major advantage of the social choice framework: "One of the advantages
of the general social-choice formulation of liberty is the opportunity that
the representational flexibility of social choice gives to bring in alternative
interpretations, depending on the nature of the problem being discussed".12
To illustrate the basic idea behind the liberal principle analysed in this
paper, we break it down into two separate subprinciples, which are of in-
dependent interest. We use simple examples of individual preferences over
alternative social states.
The Individual Damage Principle
Consider a society with two individuals, Me and You, and four social
states, x, y, x′ and y′.13 Our preference rankings over these states are indi-
cated in the table below, where a higher listed state is strictly preferred to a






Consider first the social preferences between x and y. Suppose that (for
whatever, perhaps non-welfarist, reason) society agrees with me rather than
with you, so that x is strictly socially preferred to y. Now consider a change
11Sen 1983; Sen 1992.
12Sen 1992, 144.
13We consider two-person examples only for definiteness and with no loss of generality.
All of our arguments continue to hold if ‘You’is interpreted as ‘everybody else’.
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to states x′ and y′. I am worse off at each of these states compared to the
corresponding states x and y. You, on the contrary, are perfectly indifferent
between y′ and y, and between x′ and x.14
What should the social preference between x′ and y′ be?
We submit that in any noninterfering view of society, the following argu-
ment should apply. I suffered some sort of damage at x′ and y′ compared
to x and y, respectively, while you are completely indifferent. The cause of
such damage is not clarified. It might, or might not, have been a result of
my negligence. Perhaps I did not work hard enough, or failed to insure my-
self. Perhaps it was just bad luck. Be that as it may, you were not involved
either by my bad luck or by my negligence. As far as you are concerned, you
regard the alternatives x and y in exactly the same way as you regard x′ and
y′. So, we argue, a liberal society should not reverse the strict preference
between x and y to a strict preference for y′ over x′ unless this switch does
not contradict my preferences. In this case, I prefer x′ to y′, so society should
not choose y′ over x′. Switching the social preference to y′ would imply a
further damage for me in addition to the damage that I suffered because of
the change from unprimed to primed social states. This would be a kind
of social punishment: not only was I harmed by the change in social states,
moving down in my preference ranking from x to x′, but the very decision of
society implies additional harm, making me move even further down in my
preference ranking from x′ to y′.
How could such a social sanction be justified? Only by examining the
nature of the change in social states, and by construing an argument to the
effect that the adverse change in social preferences is legitimate, or even
deserved (for example, because I was reckless, or because I caused social
opprobrium). The point of a (Millian) liberal view is that such examination
and argument are irrelevant whenever nobody else was harmed. In such cases,
society should not interfere against me. In the situation depicted, the rest of
society is completely indifferent, hence in particular it was not harmed.15
14In the example, we assume that you prefer y to x (and y′ to x′) only for definiteness.
We could have left your preferences over the two states unspecified. Your ranking of the
unprimed (and, indeed, of the primed) alternatives is not central for our liberal principle.
What does matter is that you regard the alternatives x and y in exactly the same way as
you regard x′ and y′: you are indifferent between x and x′ and between y and y′.
15If the adverse change in my situation were caused by your choices, there may be some
room for nonwelfarist concerns. However, the existence of actions taken by you that affect
me, but do not affect you in any preference-relevant way, is highly implausible. Perhaps
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The Individual Benefit Principle
The Individual Damage Principle captures only part of the intuition be-
hind Non-Interference. In fact, from a liberal point of view, there appears
to be nothing special about the fact that I suffered a damage. Had I expe-
rienced a benefit, the same arguments made above would remain valid. The
crucial point is that everybody else is entirely indifferent to the change in
social state, be it good for me or not. That is, an Individual Benefit Principle
should also apply.
Consider the same initial situation as above, and assume again that so-
ciety prefers x to y. Now consider a change to a situation in which society
has to evaluate two different states x′′ and y′′ in which I have gained some
benefit instead of suffering a damage, compared to the corresponding states
x and y, while you are completely indifferent to the change. Our preferences






What should the social preference between x′′ and y′′ be? The ethical
arguments provided to defend the Individual Damage Principle extend nat-
urally (in a liberal view) to this example. The Individual Benefit Principle
says that society should not reverse the strict preference between x and y to
a strict preference for y′′ over x′′, possibly except when the switch accords
with my own preferences - which is not the case here, since I prefer x′′ to
y′′. In other words, I can veto society from switching social preferences to
a state that is ranked lower in my preferences after a change that I prefer
to the status quo and that does not affect anybody else in any preference-
relevant way. Not to grant this veto power would allow a type of (harmful)
social interference - without in exchange preventing any harm or granting
any benefit to others - that runs exactly contrary to a liberal ethics.16
Non-Interference
more importantly, in such case, it would seem all the more desirable to impose that y′ be
not strictly preferred to x′ as a minimal requirement of justice.
16We further discuss the Individual Benefit Principle in section 7 below.
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The Principle of Non-Interference is the conjunction of the Individual
Benefit and the Individual Damage Principles. That is, it asserts that an in-
dividual has the right of seeing her preferences respected in all circumstances
of change (for the better or for the worse) for her with respect to which other
individuals are indifferent.17
3 The limits of Non-Interference
We emphasise that the Principle of Non-Interference does not aim to provide
a complete liberal theory of social choice: it captures only some aspects of
noninterfering views of society. Thus, in the previous examples, the principle
is not liberal in the sense of prescribing that x be socially preferred to y
(or vice versa). Alternatives x and y may or may not be in the individuals’
"protected spheres": Non-Interference is silent about this. Unlike Sen’s fa-
mous Minimal Liberty axiom,18 it does not assign absolute rights over pairs
of alternatives. Note, however, that precisely because our framework is not
aimed at capturing all dimensions of liberal thought, strengthening our re-
quirement (for example by adding Sen-style absolute rights), would still leave
our impossibility result secure, because we would still capture at least one
central feature of liberal concerns which causes a conflict of principles.
Non-Interference incorporates a kind of consistency requirement on liberal
views: if society (strictly) prefers x to y, then my bad luck, negligence, or
even my (possibly reckless) actions leading to x′ and y′ should not yield a
change in social preferences. Nor should social preferences change if I obtain
a benefit leading to x′′ and y′′. In any case, I should not be penalised given
that nobody is involved in any way that is preference-relevant.
Indeed, Non-Interference does not impose any constraints on social choice
in a number of cases. If social preferences over x and y were different, then
the principle would be silent. In the Individual Damage case, for example, if
society originally preferred y over x, maybe it should compensate me for the
damage by switching to a preference for x′ over y′. But maybe not. Similarly,
if I preferred y′ to x′, the principle would also be silent on whether I should
be compensated. Further, the principle is also silent in cases when you do
not remain indifferent to the change: if someone else is affected, this may
17The Principle of Non-Interference is rigorously stated in section 5 below. A formal
statement in the language of social choice theory can be found in the online Addendum.
18Sen 1970.
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provide prima facie ground for interference. But maybe not. Because we do
not aim to provide a complete liberal theory of social choice, the axiom is
appropriately silent on these controversial cases.
In summary, Non-Interference captures only some minimal implications of
liberal views. It is formulated as a purely negative prescription. It requires
noninterference in a set of social settings, but it does not characterise all
the situations in which noninterference is morally required. It provides no
guidance as to when interference is indeed legitimate.19
Non-Interference may, however, conflict with different, non-liberal, nor-
mative views. There may well be many non-liberal reasons for society to
switch strict preferences even if the conditions in the antecedent of the ax-
iom are satisfied. Consider again the above examples and suppose, solely for
the sake of argument, that individual preferences can be represented with
utility functions and that utility numbers actually contain all the norma-
tively relevant information. Then one may construct specific configurations
of utility profiles to argue that although society strictly preferred x to y, it
should strictly prefer y′ to x′. This may be justified on classical utilitarian
grounds, if the sum of individual utilities is higher at x than at y but it is
lower at x′ than at y′; or on Nash-prioritarian grounds, if the product of
individual utilities is higher at x than at y but it is lower at x′ than at y′.20
Or one may argue that although society strictly preferred x to y, it should
strictly prefer y′′ to x′′ on Rawlsian grounds by constructing examples where
the welfare of the worst-off individual is higher at x than at y but it is lower
at x′′ than at y′′.
In these cases, Non-Interference may seem objectionable, as it requires
ignoring all information concerning the size of the changes in welfare, and
their potentially relevant implications for total utility or for the welfare of
the worst off. But Non-Interference is simply not meant to capture utili-
tarian, Rawlsian, prioritarian or other intuitions. The individualistic and
non-aggregative nature of Non-Interference (focusing on changes in the situ-
ation of a single agent while keeping everyone else indifferent) aims to capture
widely shared liberal views. From a liberal perspective, it is not obvious that
properties concerning informational invariance and comparability of utility
should play any role. As Sen argues, the claims of liberty need not be "sig-
19For a discussion of the necessary and suffi cient conditions for interference in classical
liberalism, see, for example, Berger 1984; Feinberg 1984-8; McCloskey 1963; Rees 1991.
20For an illustration of such configurations of utility profiles, see alternatives x, y and
x′, y′ in the Neighbouring Islands example in section 5.1 below.
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nificantly contingent on interpersonal comparisons. The force of one’s claims
over one’s private domain lies in the personal nature of that choice - not on
the relative intensities of the preferences of different persons over a particular
person’s private life".21 For this reason we have formulated Non-Interference
purely in terms of ordinal preferences, which by definition cannot incorporate
such concerns.
Another important conceptual point is the following. Non-Interference
applies to any two pairs of alternatives x, y, and x′, y′ (or x′′, y′′) that satisfy
a certain configuration of (individual and social) preferences. The change
from x, y, to x′, y′ concerns only one individual if everybody else is indifferent
between the unprimed and the corresponding primed alternatives. One may
argue, however, that a more restrictive notion is more appropriate to capture
liberal views whereby, in addition to the indifference of everybody else to
the change, the only difference between the primed and the unprimed social
states concerns my allocation, with the allocation of all other individuals
unchanged. For, the choice between x, y may be very different from that
between x′, y′ from a liberal perspective, even if everybody else is indifferent
between the primed and the corresponding unprimed alternatives.
Suppose, for example, that x, y lie in what a liberal would consider my
protected sphere - the only difference between them being, say, whether I
sleep on my belly or not, - while x′, y′ lie in what may be seen as your
protected sphere - the only difference between them being, say, the colour of
your shoes. It is logically possible that, given a suitable series of adjustments
in other characteristics of the social states, you are indifferent between x and
x′, and between y and y′, and yet a liberal may argue that society should
both prefer x to y and y′ to x′, contradicting Non-Interference.
The empirical relevance of this objection is debatable, but even granting
it, what matters is that it has no logical bite for our conclusions. In fact,
as the example in section 5.1 below illustrates,22 our main Theorem holds
even if Non-Interference is restricted to apply to those changes in social
states that concern only the allocation of goods and opportunities to a single
individual (leaving the allocation of all other agents unchanged) and that
leave everybody else indifferent.23
21Sen 1999, 364. See also Sen 1976; Sen 1981. Indeed, one may argue that "libertar-
ian rights clearly involve protection of the rightholder from the effects of interpersonal
comparisons of intensity with respect to his private kind of utility" (Riley 1985, 1140).
22And as the demonstration of Theorem 1 in the online Addendum formally proves.
23Similarly, given that we have left the interpretation of individual preference relations
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We prefer the present formulation because, from an ethical viewpoint, the
force of Non-Interference seems to us to derive primarily from the fact that
everybody else regards the alternatives in exactly the same way, rather than
from the nature of the social states. The indifference of everybody else to a
certain change captures neatly the liberal no-harm intuition.
4 The liberal roots of Non-Interference
It seems hard to find objections of a liberal nature to Non-Interference. But
we think that Non-Interference does positively capture some substantial as-
pects of classical liberal and libertarian approaches. We outline here the
conceptual relations between Non-Interference and a central principle in the
liberal literature, namely John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’. The aim is not
to show that Non-Interference is a full formalisation of the harm principle;
nor that it captures all —or even most —of the tenets of liberal approaches.
Rather, we argue that Non-Interference incorporates some important intu-
itions shared by liberal thinkers.24
Consider for example Mill’s classic statement of the harm principle:
"the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others ... The only part of the conduct of anyone,
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.
In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is,
of right, absolute." (On Liberty, I.9).
What does ‘exercising power against somebody’s will’mean in our frame-
work? It corresponds to society switching its ranking of social states in a
way that is contrary to the individual’s preferences. It is hard to deny that
open, one may construct examples in which individual motivations in the evaluation of
x, y, and x′, y′ are such that a liberal society might prefer x to y but y′ to x′ (for example,
because my preference for x′ over y′ in section 2 reflects a meddlesome, nonliberal or even
malicious attitude). This objection also has no logical bite for our conclusions. As argued
below, all of our results hold even if one restricts the analysis to ‘laundered’ individual
preferences, or if one interprets preferences as reflecting individual welfare.
24Although we focus on Mill’s doctrine of liberty, Non-Interference also has some inter-
esting links with libertarian approaches and entitlement theories of justice. For a thorough
analysis, see Mariotti and Veneziani 2014.
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any exercise of power against one’s will runs against one’s preferences. As
Isaiah Berlin put it in his famous discussion of Mill’s theory, "all coercion is,
in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such".25
More generally, our formulation of Non-Interference is meant to incor-
porate the consequentialist, if not straight welfarist (or preference-based)
aspects of Mill’s approach. In the opening pages of his essay, Mill writes that
"It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived
to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of
utility" (On Liberty, I.11). Even more explicitly, Mill goes on to say that
"I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions" (On Lib-
erty, I.11). Furthermore, in Mill’s own formulation, the harm principle is
concerned with actions that affect other people’s welfare, and not only their
rights or freedoms, and "the formula ‘coercion to prevent coercion’used by
some liberals is distinct from Mill’s ‘coercion to prevent harm’".26
Consider the alternatives x and y in the above examples. It may well
be that x was strictly socially preferred to y because of the nature of the
alternatives (and not merely because of the preference configuration). Hence,
in principle, as x′ and y′ represent different alternatives, a non-welfarist might
well prefer to switch to a preference for y′ over x′. What Mill is saying is that,
in the circumstances described, certain non-welfarist arguments are not valid:
whatever non-welfarist argument led to socially prefer x to y, this argument
must still stand for x′ and y′, given that all other individuals are unaffected.
The lack of harm to others (note well, itself a welfarist, or preference-based
proposition) possibly justifies ignoring certain non-welfare features of the
social states (e.g. the moral opprobrium inherent in the actions that cause
them).
In his examples, Mill focuses especially on instances of damage to the
individual: "he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error;
if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire
to spoil it further" (On Liberty, IV.7). In our terminology, he seems partic-
ularly keen on the Individual Damage Principle. But upon closer reading,
Mill’s argument itself has really nothing to do with whether changes are
positive or negative for the individual concerned. Mill’s argument is that
it is inappropriate to interfere with free individual choices even when they
25Berlin 1969, 128, italics added.
26McCloskey 1963, 147. After all, according to Mill, "liberty consists in doing what one
desires" (On Liberty, V.5, italics added).
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are objectionable (from another individual’s viewpoint). He wants to make
his point as stark as possible even in those cases that may have been more
controversial for his Victorian readers.
Take, for example, the passage quoted earlier, when he says "In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute".
‘Damage’is not mentioned at all, just the fact that the events under consid-
eration concern only the individual himself (which we express formally with
the indifference of everybody else to the change, except for the individual
concerned). So a similar principle must apply, from a liberal perspective
and almost certainly in Mill’s view, to preference-enhancing decisions, acts,
or events that do not affect others. This is captured by the Benefit part of
Non-Interference.
There are, however, some important conceptual differences between Non-
Interference and the harm principle. In particular, Non-Interference pre-
scribes that society should remain passive only in those situations when
everybody else is exactly indifferent to changes in the circumstances of the
individual, whereas a literal reading of the harm principle would prevent in-
terference when everybody else is benefitted by the change and even in some
situations in which changes in one individual’s conditions negatively affect
others. For, not all changes to social states that are ranked lower in some
individual’s preferences count as harms in Mill’s approach - for example, a
simple distaste or dislike does not constitute ‘harm’.27 In these cases, Non-
Interference imposes no restriction on social preferences, while Mill’s harm
principle requires society not to interfere, even though other individuals are
not completely indifferent.
To be sure, there may well be changes in social states to which other
agents are not indifferent that a liberal would not count as harms, so that
the conclusion that y′ should not be strictly preferred to x′ would stand. Yet
our aim is to highlight a deep conflict between some key democratic values
and the core of a liberal noninterfering view of society. For this purpose, we
need not define the exact boundaries of the individual’s protected sphere. On
the contrary, it is desirable to focus on the logically weakest principle that
captures one fundamental insight: whatever other situations there may be
in which individuals should be protected, if all other agents are indifferent
to the change in social states affecting an individual - whatever its source -
27Riley 1998, 98-9.
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then there is no ground for interference.28
5 The Impossibility of Non-Interference
Consider a society with a finite set N of individuals.29 A generic individual
in this society is denoted with the letter i. Let X denote the set of con-
ceivable social states that must be ranked by society, and assume that each
agent has a given preference ordering over alternatives in X, denoted generi-
cally as x and y. We follow the literature and assume that the economic and
political environment contains a suffi ciently rich set of alternatives, in order
to capture the fundamental diversity and complexity that characterises mod-
ern societies.30 We conceive of the collective choice problem in the standard
way: we aim to identify some desirable properties that any social ranking of
alternatives should satisfy, for a given set of individual preferences.31
The following two properties are standard. They incorporate widely
shared views on the democratic nature of social choice, namely the prin-
ciple of unanimity and the idea that no individual shall have his or her own
preferences prevail in all possible circumstances:
Weak Pareto: For any two social states x, y, if all agents strictly prefer x
to y, then x must be strictly socially preferred to y.
28Our focus on this core of social situations also allows us to eschew all discussions of
the difference between "private and public versions of the harm principle" (Danley 1979,
420) as well as between harm caused by action and harm caused by inaction (see, e.g.,
Berger 1984, 255ff; Wellman 1996). By assuming that the other agents are indifferent, the
axiom assumes all types of harm away and makes these distinctions less relevant in our
analysis. We further discuss the notion of harm in section 6.2.
29See Lombardi, Miyagishima, and Veneziani 2016 for an analysis of principles of non-
interference in societies with an infinite number of agents.
30For a formal definition of the Richness assumption (and of the main axioms), see
the online Addendum. Similar assumptions are standard in the so-called ‘single-profile’
literature (see footnote 31 below) in order to rule out uninteresting social choice settings
with a very small number of alternatives, or in which all agents have identical (or very
similar) preferences.
31Formally, our impossibility result is demonstrated in the context of a given profile of
individual preferences - the so-called ‘single-profile’setting - rather than in the classical
Arrovian ‘multi-profile’framework with many varying individual preference profiles. None
of the conditions of our impossibility result cuts across different preference profiles. For a
comprehensive discussion see Feldman and Serrano 2008; Fleurbaey and Mongin 2005.
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Non-Dictatorship: For every agent i, there exist two social states x, y
such that i strictly prefers x to y but society weakly prefers y to x.
Next, we introduce the main principle incorporating a liberal view of
autonomy and noninterference:
Non-Interference: Suppose that x and y are two social states such that x
is strictly socially preferred to y. Consider two different social states x′ and
y′ such that
(1) either agent i strictly prefers x to x′ and y to y′, or she strictly prefers
x′ to x and y′ to y;
(2) everybody else is indifferent between each state x, y, and the corre-
sponding primed state, x′, y′;
(3) agent i strictly prefers x′ to y′.
Then society should not reverse the strict preference between x and y to
a strict preference for y′ over x′.
Our result is that, in a suffi ciently diverse environment, the three condi-
tions defined so far are incompatible:
Theorem 1 : In a rich environment, there is no social preference ordering
that satisfies Weak Pareto, Non-Dictatorship, and Non-Interference.
The basic logic of the demonstration of the impossibility can be illustrated
by means of the following two-person example.32
5.1 The neighbouring (almost) desert islands
Andrea is young, vegetarian, and loves hiking and meeting new people (but
she does not wish to live with anyone). Bob is middle-aged and does not
enjoy company, but has a passion for beer and fishing. They live in two
different islands and each of them is the only inhabitant of an island. The
two islands are suffi ciently far apart that, on the whole, they can live their
lives independently, but they are suffi ciently close that a number of decisions
must be taken collectively. In this section, we translate the social preference
ordering into the language of choice in order to provide one illustration of
the possible interpretations of the impossibility result (see section 2 above).
32A complete formal proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the online Addendum.
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In particular, Andrea and Bob have to take collective decisions concerning
the management of the canal between the islands in different social states.
Consider first the choice between two social states x and y: each state
is a full description of the world, which includes everything that may be
relevant for individual and social evaluation, and we assume that the only
difference between them is that in x a boat with a large group of young
people partying is allowed to sail along the canal, whereas in y it is not.
We represent preferences over the two states with ordinal utility functions
and fix specific values. This is only for clarity and nothing in our analysis
depends either on the possibility of representing individual preferences with





Next, Andrea and Bob have to choose between two social states p and q,
the only difference between them being that in q Bob is allowed to fish in
the canal, whereas in p he is not. The following utility profiles represent the
individual preferences over these states.




When it comes to choosing between x and y, and between p and q, their
preferences conflict: Andrea would like the boat to sail in the canal, and to
ban fishing, while Bob ranks the options in exactly the opposite way.
They reject dictatorial social arrangements and decide to adjudicate these
conflicts so that each of them has their preferred choice respected once. With-
out loss of generality, suppose that Andrea’s preferences prevail in the choice
between x and y, while Bob’s preferences are relevant in the choice between
16
p and q. Hence, when considering these two pairs of social states, they decide
to allow Bob to fish in the canal and the boat to sail by.33
In other words, x is (strictly) socially preferred to y and q is (strictly)
socially preferred to p.34
Now consider a change from x and y to two different states x′ and y′
which affects only Andrea: perhaps she has broken her leg while hiking in a
well-known dangerous spot; or she has been forced to hunt due to a disease
that has destroyed all edible plants in her island. Thus, she prefers each
of the original states x and y to the corresponding states x′ and y′. Bob,
instead, does not care at all whether the state is x′ or x, and whether the




Similarly, consider a change from p and q to two different states p′ and q′
which affects only Bob: perhaps a hurricane has destroyed his dwelling; or he
has fallen ill after trying to distil an alcoholic drink from a plant growing in
his island. He prefers each of the original states p and q to the corresponding
new states p′ and q′. Andrea, instead, does not care at all whether the state




What should the social preference between the alternatives be? Can
Andrea and Bob design a liberal democratic social decision rule that incor-
porates both unanimity and a noninterfering view?
33It is worth stressing again that Andrea and Bob are not deciding whether to allow
fishing, or sailing, in the canal in general. Their choice is not over binary alternatives
(fishing/no fishing, sailing/no sailing) but over pairs of social states. Hence, they decide
to allow Bob to fish in the canal in the choice between p and q and the boat to sail by
in the choice between x and y, but they may decide otherwise in different contexts - i.e.,
when comparing other pairs of social states.
34The assumption that q is strictly socially preferred to p and that x is strictly socially
preferred to y entails no loss of generality because by Non-Dictatorship and Weak Pareto
two such pairs always exist (see the online Addendum).
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Because they had decided to allow Bob to fish in the canal in the choice
between p and q, by Non-Interference they should not switch to forbidding
it. To do this after Bob has fallen ill, or has seen his dwelling destroyed
would be an unjustified punishment for him, given that Andrea is unaffected.
Therefore q′ should be (weakly) socially preferred to p′.
Similarly, by Non-Interference, forbidding the boat to sail by after Andrea
has broken her leg, or has had to hunt against her vegetarian convictions
would be an unjustified punishment for her, given that Bob is unaffected.
Therefore x′ should be (weakly) socially preferred to y′.
However, Andrea and Bob would unanimously strictly prefer p′ to x′, and
y′ to q′, and this brings them to a deadlock. For p′ is strictly preferred to
x′ (by Weak Pareto), which is weakly preferred to y′ (by Non-Interference),
which is in turn strictly preferred to q′ (by Weak Pareto), which is - finally
- weakly preferred to p′ (by Non-Interference), a contradiction.35
6 The conflict of principles
Theorem 1 proves that there is an inconsistency between liberal approaches
to social decision-making, as captured by Non-Interference, and the basic
democratic principles of unanimity and non-dictatorship. The next question,
then, concerns the implications of this inconsistency for liberal democratic
approaches. For "The impossibility ... just brings out a conflict of principles
... The really interesting issues relate to the implications of the conflict.
There are implications both for evaluation of outcomes and for choice of
decision procedures".36
In this section we explore the philosophical implications of this inconsis-
tency. We interpret our arguments and Theorem 1 "as guideposts to the
creation of a more acceptable theory of liberal democracy".37 Therefore we
reconsider the axiomatic framework in order to understand how to construct
a coherent approach to social decision making that respects fundamental
democratic values and liberal principles of noninterference.38
35The example only illustrates the basic logic of the proof and it is based on a specific
initial configuration of individual preferences. The same conclusion holds for any initial
individual preferences (see the online Addendum).
36Sen 1983, 28.
37Riley 1985, 1135-6.
38On some views, liberal rights require a purely procedural formulation and cannot be
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6.1 Non-Dictatorship and Unanimity
One possible interpretation of the conflict of principles is that we should
reconsider our intuitions about democratic procedures as incorporated in
our axioms. We do not think that this is the most convincing, or promising
interpretation.39
Non-Dictatorship
Non-Dictatorship rules out the possibility that social choices coincide with
the preferences of one individual, regardless of the preferences of all other
members of society. It may be argued, however, that not all dictatorships
are problematic in our single-profile framework. In the standard Arrovian
context, the existence of a dictator implies that there is an agent whose
ranking between any two pairs of alternatives prevails for any possible profile
of preferences - an obviously undesirable property. In a single-profile world,
instead, there are situations in which the presence of dictators does not seem
in contrast with a democratic ethos. For example, according to our Non-
Dictatorship axiom, agents who are indifferent between all alternatives are
trivially dictators, and so are all agents in society whenever they all have
exactly the same preferences and Weak Pareto is satisfied. These forms of
"innocuous dictatorships"40 seem hardly objectionable and may suggest that
Non-Dictatorship does not properly capture our intuitions on democratic
procedures.
captured in a social choice framework. (See, for example, the discussion in Sugden 1993
and the references therein.) We do not find this objection cogent. Even granting the
importance of procedural aspects, nothing prevents them to be incorporated into a social
choice framework. As Sen (1983; 1992) has convincingly argued, in fact, the interpretation
of the social preference relation need not focus exclusively on the intrinsic characteristics
of the social states and can incorporate a social judgement of the process yielding certain
outcomes. Moreover, a procedural approach to rights can hardly question the basic insight
of Theorem 1 that a social decision-making procedure that respects liberal rights can
conflict with democratic principles. That this conflict is unavoidable has been recognised
by many advocates of the procedural approach (see, e.g., McQuillin and Sugden 2011).
For a detailed discussion, see Mariotti and Veneziani 2014.
39We note in passing that one way to avoid the inconsistency is to allow social preferences
to be incomplete. Yet, this is not a solution to the conflict of principles. It is rather a way
of bypassing it by declaring society unable to choose in those situations that create the
conflict. A similar objection can be moved to any attempt to avoid the impossibility by
dropping transitivity, or our condition that the economic environment be suffi ciently rich
(see the online Addendum).
40Feldman and Serrano 2008.
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This conclusion is unwarranted, however, and the implications of Theorem
1 maintain all of their normative force. At a general theoretical level, it is true
that in a single-profile world there may be - in principle - some preference
profiles such that dictators are not of great moral concern. This happens
when the dictator has no real influence on social outcomes, for example,
because there is no conflict of interest as all agents have identical preferences,
or the dictator actually has no strong views about alternative allocations. Yet
Theorem 1 continues to hold in situations in which people do have strong
views about social choice and desirable allocations, and their preferences are
in conflict, and the existence of a dictator is indeed problematic in these
cases. Formally, our analysis holds for any given profile of preferences, and
"while in some cases an innocuous dictatorship is acceptable, in many other
cases it is very much unacceptable".41
As in the standard Arrovian context, dictatorships involve "(1) in politics,
an extreme sacrifice of participatory decisions, and (2) in welfare economics,
a gross inability to be sensitive to the heterogeneous interests of a diverse
population".42
Unanimity
Weak Pareto also captures a fundamental property of liberal democracies.
As noted even by one of the most prominent critics of the Pareto principle,
"there is something very central in the idea that preferences unanimously held
by all members of a community cannot be rejected by that community".43
And it is unclear that Theorem 1 can be interpreted as raising doubts on
Weak Pareto.
To see this point, and to shed further light on Non-Interference, it is
instructive to compare our result with Sen’s classic contribution.44 In his
Minimal Liberty axiom, liberalism is formalised as the requirement that an
individual has a sphere of complete control on society’s preferences over min-
imal subsets of social states. Sen’s Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal can
41Feldman and Serrano 2008, 22. Moreover, by assuming the context in which choices
are made to be suffi ciently rich, we can rule out the innocuous dictatorships and focus on
the core situations of interest for democratic approaches, namely those where democratic
procedures are necessary to adjudicate deep conflicts due to significant heterogeneity. (See





thus be interpreted as identifying a contradiction between the Pareto prin-
ciple as a democratic rule (unanimity) and a respect for absolute libertarian
rights.45 We follow Sen by identifying a conflict between democratic rules
(the unanimity principle and non-dictatorship) and a liberal right (to Non-
Interference), but unlike Sen the conflict is not due to a pre-assigned physical
sphere of exclusive competence of the individual. In our approach it is not
the nature of the social states that defines individual freedom: it is the fact
that the rest of society does not care about certain social states.
Sen’s axiom captures individual autonomy by defining a sphere of posi-
tive freedom that overrides concerns about other people’s preferences. This
is an important difference from Non-Interference, which embodies a notion
of personal autonomy in terms of negative freedom, namely as the protec-
tion from interference under certain circumstances not involving others (that
is, in the language of preferences, circumstances to which others are indif-
ferent). If Sen’s Minimal Liberty axiom is understood as a "social choice
formulation of rights",46 then it can be interpreted as assuming the existence
of a personal sphere over which individuals have a right to have their pref-
erences respected, regardless of other people’s preferences. In the language
of rights, Non-Interference would capture a different, and arguably weaker
type of right, namely the right to be protected from adverse changes in strict
social preferences, when others are unaffected in any preference-relevant way.
The differences between Non-Interference and Minimal Liberty have rel-
evant implications concerning the interpretation of Theorem 1. The ‘im-
possibility of a Paretian liberal’47 has been famously interpreted by Sen as
suggesting "the unacceptability of the Pareto principle as a universal rule"48
because it uncovers a direct conflict between a non-welfarist liberal axiom
and the Pareto principle, and because the conflict arises from meddlesome
preferences. Neither issue arises in our analysis. On the one hand, the im-
possibility result does not arise from the clash between a non-welfarist liberal
principle and the weak form of welfarism embodied in Weak Pareto because,
as argued above, Non-Interference itself incorporates some relevant welfarist
(or, more precisely, preference-based) considerations.






no role in Theorem 1. Formally, unlike in Sen’s seminal contribution,49 our
result does not depend on the Unrestricted Domain assumption, which re-
quires that all logically conceivable combinations of preferences be possible,
and which yields Sen’s impossibility result when some individuals have med-
dlesome preferences. We adopt a ‘single-profile’ framework: instead of as-
suming a social decision rule that converts all preference profiles into a social
ordering (while respecting some desirable properties that possibly cut across
different profiles), we have a fixed set of individual preferences. Our prop-
erties apply to that given profile, but our result holds for any given profile:
meddlesome preferences, or indeed any preference externalities play no role.
The impossibility result would still stand if we interpreted agents’preferences
as ‘laundered preferences’to exclude all morally objectionable, meddlesome,
nonliberal views. But then, unlike in Sen’s case, Theorem 1 cannot be used
to motivate a rejection, or weakening of the Pareto Principle.
6.2 Harmless wrongdoings
Even accepting that Non-Interference captures some important aspects of the
standard interpretation of the Millian doctrine of liberty in terms of harm to
others, one may question the consequentialist reading of Mill itself and reject
harm-based approaches in favour of a rights-based approach to liberalism.
In particular, according to some authors, Mill holds that certain acts are
within individuals’rights because they are of a type with regard to which
individuals need liberty in order to develop their individuality, which is a
prerequisite to human happiness.50 The fact that some acts do or do not
harm others is irrelevant in order to determine whether they belong to the
individual protected sphere.51
The rights-based approach to the liberal doctrine of liberty raises complex
and important issues, both exegetical and philosophical. In this section, we
discuss only those aspects that are directly relevant for our analysis.
The key point to note is that, whether or not harmful acts are suffi cient
as prima facie grounds for intervention is important in a general liberal the-
ory of the state, but it is irrelevant, both formally and theoretically, in our
analysis. Non-Interference identifies a necessary condition for interference
and the conflict with the democratic principles of unanimity and the absence
49Sen 1970.
50See the discussion of Mill’s concept of "experiments in living" in Anderson (1991).
51Berger 1984; Jacobson 2000; Ripstein 2006; Vernon 1996.
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of dictators does not arise from the specification of conditions under which
the state should intervene in individual affairs.
The question, then, is whether harm is a necessary condition for indi-
vidual acts to be prima facie subject to social scrutiny, as in the standard
interpretation of Mill.52 According to critics, this is not the case and there
are harmless acts that warrant intervention. In our context this is relevant as
it can be interpreted as suggesting that Non-Interference be dropped: even
if no harm is done, there may be no right to a protected sphere and so the
condition in the consequent of the axiom may be violated, with a switch
in society’s strict preferences against the individual. In principle, this may
provide a liberal way out of the impossibility result.
However, it does not appear that the types of harmless conduct analysed
in the literature (including harmless wrongdoings and positive obligations)
raise significant doubts on the relevance of harm as a necessary condition for
interference in our framework.53 Consider the central example of harmless
wrongdoing, analysed by Ripstein, namely harmless trespass.54 "Suppose
that, as you are reading this in your offi ce or in the library, I let myself into
your home, using burglary tools that do no damage to your locks, and take
a nap in your bed. I make sure everything is clean. I bring hypoallergenic
and lint-free pajamas and a hairnet. I put my own sheets and pillowcase
down over yours. I do not weigh very much, so the wear and tear on your
mattress is nonexistent. By any ordinary understanding of harm, I do you
no harm".55 Nonetheless, argues Ripstein, most people would object to the
trespass: "Your objection is to my deed, my trespass against your home, not
to its effects".56 Harm is irrelevant, and the harmless act nonetheless asks
for state intervention to protect private property.
The force of the example crucially rests on a notion of harm that is more
restrictive than mere moves to less preferred alternatives. Ripstein does not
provide a thorough explicit definition of the relevant notion of harm, but he
can conclude that the nap is harmless because he excludes the possibility
that I can harm you simply "by upsetting you when you learn of my deed, or
52Riley 1998, 191.
53An earlier authoritative discussion of harmless wrongdoings is in Feinberg 1984-8.
54Ripstein 2006. Although we focus on harmless wrongdoings, given our social choice





by leading to fears that people will do this sort of thing to others",57 and a
fortiori by taking an action that you merely dislike. Negative effects in terms
of individual preferences, according to Ripstein, are not suffi cient to identify
harmful acts. The reason is that if harm is interpreted broadly (to include all
acts and choices that have adverse effects in terms of individual preferences),
then the harm principle "is not a liberal principle. If those harms count,
the harm principle underwrites many of the prohibitions it is supposed to
exclude".58
In the analysis of necessary and suffi cient conditions for interference, a
broad notion of harm may well be objectionable. Yet both the nap example
and Non-Interference focus specifically on harm as a necessary condition
for individual acts to be prima facie subject to social scrutiny. From this
perspective, a broad notion of harm that encompasses mere moves to less
preferred alternatives is logically and conceptually consistent with a liberal
approach: if, even under the broadest possible notion of harm, an act has no
harmful effect on others, then this provides strong liberal ground to avoid
interference.59 This intuition underlies our formulation of Non-Interference
and, as shown by Theorem 1, it has surprising and substantive implications.60
If a broad notion of harm is adopted, it is doubtful that my nap represents
a harmless wrongdoing. The point is not so much that the trespass would be
57Ripstein 2006, 220.
58Ripstein 2006, 221-2.
59It might be objected that, under a broad definition of harm, Non-Interference is em-
pirically irrelevant, for all meaningful individual acts have an effect on others. Yet ours
is a logical inquiry into the consistency of liberal approaches. From a logical viewpoint,
it is certainly possible to draw a meaningful distinction between self-regarding and other-
regarding conduct.
Even empirically, one may argue with Mill that "it is impossible for a person to do
anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least
to his near connections, and often far beyond them" (On Liberty, IV.8, italics added).
But the idea that all conceivable events or acts have significant effects on others is not
plausible. All the classical normative Sen examples of others’activities that people should
not care about according to a liberal view could be used in a positive sense: it is a matter
of fact that people normally do not care about whether others sleep on their belly or what
colour they paint their walls.
60This by no means implies that the notion of harm underlying Non-Interference corre-
sponds to Mill’s, nor does it suggest that it is the appropriate notion in a liberal theory
of the state. In defining the boundaries of state intervention, Mill clearly holds a stronger
notion of harm (see, for example, On Liberty I.12, IV.5, IV.12). For a thorough discussion,
see Berger 1984; Riley 1985; Riley 1998; Ten 1980.
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harmful because you would rather that I do not enter your house and so it
should be outlawed (although it is indeed likely that my entering your house
will not leave you indifferent). Rather, contra Ripstein, it may be argued
that if it is really the case that my act leaves you completely indifferent
then it is not a wrongdoing and the trespass should indeed not be interfered
with, consistently with the standard interpretation of the harm principle (and
with our formulation of Non-Interference). After all, my act has no effects
whatsoever on you, and you are completely indifferent. If you do not care,
why should society?61
In summary, we come back to the point that Non-Interference does not
capture all that is relevant in a liberal, or libertarian, approach. Rather, by
focusing on a very specific and restricted set of configurations of alternatives,
Non-Interference does incorporate some core liberal insights concerning the
right of individuals to be protected from unjustified interference.
7 A possible way out? Damage vs. benefit
Short of giving up non-dictatorship or unanimity, is there a way to construct
a consistent liberal democratic approach to social choice? We take Theorem 1
as a demonstration that it is impossible to make social choices in democratic
institutions without somehow considering at least some individual actions as
relevant even when they affect only one individual. Social judgements cannot
treat individuals as separate entities even if these individuals themselves do
nothing to interfere with others.62 The question then is how to weaken Non-
Interference while retaining some key liberal intuitions.
Let us focus on the Individual Benefit Principle. Consider the example
in section 2 above. Imagine that alternatives x and y are such that in y I am
taxed, whereas in x I am not, and suppose that (for whatever reason) x is
61It is worth emphasising again that nothing in our analysis depends on the agents’
ignorance of essential features of social states. A social state x provides a complete de-
scription of the world, which includes everything that may be relevant for individual and
social evaluation (see section 2). The fact that everybody else remains indifferent does
not depend (either formally or morally) on their being ignorant of what has occurred in
moving from the states x, y to the states, x′, y′.
62While the framework is very different, our conclusion is broadly in line with that of
Braham and van Hees (2014). They show that the search for a pure libertarian mechanism
that allows all social disputes to be settled uniquely by an appeal to rights is elusive. Agents
cannot be seen as separate islands: they need to interact in society.
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strictly socially preferred to y. Suppose next that I suddenly become richer
due to brute luck and with no effort on my own part (leading to x′′ and y′′):
on the basis of the Individual Benefit Principle, I could resist any attempt
to pay even one penny of taxes on my additional income.
This may seem prima facie unreasonable and one may object that the
Individual Benefit Principle fails to properly capture liberal views. For, one
may argue that, while agents can keep the fruits of their labour and efforts,
pure windfalls should be shared. There are two reasons why this objection
appears unconvincing to us. First, it is worth emphasising again that I have
a rather weak veto power which indeed allows for the possibility that in the
end - perhaps after a fair coin toss - society does opt for taxation (y′′) because
Non-Interference does not rule out the possibility of a switch to indifference
after my windfall gain.
Second, the view that individuals are not entitled to any gains due to
brute luck is common in some liberal egalitarian approaches but it is far
from being salient in classical liberal and libertarian views, especially if one
notes, once again, that whatever change occurs to me does not affect anybody
else. For "the libertarian accepts the idea that no one, no state, has a moral
right to enforce a redistribution of wealth or property".63
Nevertheless, although we do not think that one can reject the Individual
Benefit Principle on general liberal grounds, and no distinction between the
Damage and Benefit parts of the harm principle can be found in Mill, there
is a sense in which going against an individual’s preference after she has
been damaged is different from doing the same thing after she has benefit-
ted. The first course can only be construed as a punishment or as a sadistic
exercise, while the second could take the form of a justified ‘correction’to
someone’s gain. While not liberal, this form of interference could be easier
to accept for a liberal than the other form, especially from a non-welfarist
perspective that allows one to scrutinise the source of the gains. As noted
earlier, liberal egalitarianism, for example, admits that pure windfalls to an
individual should be shared. In a welfarist, level comparable setting, Mari-
otti and Veneziani have demonstrated that this leads straight to an unusual
conclusion from the liberal point of view, namely welfare egalitarianism.64 In
the non-welfarist context of this work, no such conclusion is granted or even
meaningful. It remains an open question to study what limitations to social
63Danley 1979, 419.
64Mariotti and Veneziani 2009.
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choice the Individual Damage Principle implies in this context.
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